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Abstract
This paper studies the quantity-quality trade-o¤model of fertility,
under the assumption of hyperbolic discounting. It shows that the
lack of self-control may play a di¤erent role in a developed economy
and in a developing one. In the rst case, characterized by a positive
investment in quality, the lack of self control may tend to reduce fer-
tility. In the second case, it is possible that the lack of self-control
leads to both no investment in quality and a higher fertility rate. It
is also proved that if parents cannot commit on their investment in
quality, a small change of parameters may lead to a jump in fertility
and education.
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1 Introduction
From the seminal articles of Becker and Lewis (1973), and Becker and Tomes
(1976), the benchmark theory of fertility decisions within the family is the
quantity-quality trade-o¤ model. According to this model, the quality and
quantity of children are both endogenous variables. Fertility behaviors and
investments in childrens human capital are consciously and jointly deter-
mined by parents. This theory explains fertility and education behaviors as
an optimal choice of the household, depending on its income and on the costs
of quality and quantity. One major outcome of this literature is to provide an
explanation of education and fertility behaviors in developing and developed
countries. In developing countries, the cost of quantity is relatively low with
respect to the family income, and the cost of quality relatively high. This
may explain a high investment in quantity and a low investment in quality
in such countries. In developed economies, the cost of quantity is relatively
high with respect to the family income, and the cost of quality relatively low.
This may result in a low fertility rate and in a high investment in education.
In this paper, I argue that this theory is founded on the implicit assump-
tion of perfect self-control of the household. Indeed, as education decisions
are taken after the fertility decision, it is not obvious that the education deci-
sion ex-post is consistent with the education decision planned at the time of
the fertility choice. This problem of self-control exists if agents are endowed
with a non recursive utility function, for instance if the ows of instantaneous
utilities are discounted with (quasi)-hyperbolic discounting.
How self-control problems can change the trade-o¤ between quantity and
quality? This paper shows that the lack of self-control may play a di¤erent
role in a developed economy and in a developing one. In a developed country,
the lack of self control may tend to reduce fertility and increase education,
whereas it may reduce education and increase fertility in a developing coun-
try. Moreover, compulsory schooling may play the role of a commitment
technology in a developing country that allows to reduce fertility.
Recently, a growing literature has stressed the assumption of (quasi)-
hyperbolic discount rates. It seems more consistent with laboratory experi-
ments that nd a negative relationship between discount rates and time delay
(see e. g. Loewenstein, and Thaler (1989)). The consequences of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting have been studied in various frameworks. Many arti-
cles have been concerned with savings behavior, mainly Harris and Laibson
(2001) and Laibson (1997). Diamond and Köszegi (2003) applied hyperbolic
discounting to the early retirement pattern of workers. Barro (1999) intro-
duced this assumption in a standard growth model. Wrede (2009) applies
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quasi-hyperbolic discounting to the timing and number of births, pointing
out a possible postponement of births.
A recent article by Salanié and Treich (2006) has made a breakthrough in
this literature. In discrete time, quasi-hyperbolic discounting is introduced
in the intertemporal utility function of the consumer by adding an extra pa-
rameter   1 that represents the bias for the present. The instantaneous
ows of utility are weighted by the discount factors: 1; ; 2; 3; etc. The
standard assumption of exponential consumers is obtained for  = 1: Hyper-
bolic consumers have a bias for the present  < 1: In order to evaluate the
impact of self-control on behaviors, most articles have compared the results
obtained for  < 1 with that obtained for  = 1: The point made by Salanié
and Treich is that this comparison is not appropriate to isolate the e¤ect
of a lack of self-control, as  also modies the preferences of the consumer.
The only pertinent comparison is between the behavior of a consumer with
commitment power, and that of a consumer without this power.
In this paper I consider a simple model in which parents arbitrate between
the quantity and the quality of their children, as in the benchmark models
of Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976). These seminal
contributions used a static microeconomic model of demand for quantity and
quality of children. In order to study the problem of time consistency of the
behaviors, the dynamic structure of the problem must be introduced, here
the fact that the choice of fertility is taken before the choice of education.
Self-control problems may only occur in a dynamic model that include (at
least) three periods, with one decision in the rst period and one in the
second one.
The households utility depends on the ows of instantaneous utility
obtained during three periods. These ows are discounted with a quasi-
hyperbolic discount factor. In the rst period, the household chooses the
quantity of children. Each Child entails a cost in time for the household
(mainly for the wife) and implies a reduction of income. This cost comes
from child rearing and the primary education given inside the family. In the
second period, the household chooses the quality level (the education level)
given to each child. The education cost is proportional to the number of chil-
dren and to the level of quality. Finally, in the third period the ow of utility
depends positively on both quantity and quality levels. This last assumption
corresponds to the altruistic feeling of parents that value both the number
and the quality of their children.
The decision process within the household is based on the following as-
sumptions. There is no problem of coordination between spouses in the
household, following the unitary model: at each period parents make a joint
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decision or there is a household head that makes all the decisions. But, as
preferences are not time-consistent, there is a conict between the objective
functions of the household in periods 1 and 2. From Strotz (1956), the usual
way to solve this problem consists in assuming an intrapersonal game. The
household is made of a sequence of selves and self i is the decision taker in
period i. The solution resulting from the equilibrium of this game is called
the Temporary Consistent solution (TC in abbreviated form), or the "sophis-
ticated" behavior. This is the solution that is mainly studied in the literature
(see, for example, Laibson 1997, Harris and Laibson 2001, or Diamond and
Köszegi 2003). Another solution, called the Commitment solution (C in ab-
breviated form) corresponds to the optimal choice if the rst self can take all
decisions at all periods. This solution corresponds to a perfect self-control.
In practice, the household needs a "Commitment technology" in order to
implement the Commitment solution, which means a way to constrain the
decision of future selves. For instance, in savings behaviors, the access to
an illiquid asset can be viewed as an imperfect commitment technology (see
Laibson 1997).
Following Salanié and Treich, the commitment solution for fertility and
education is compared to the temporary consistent solution. Two cases are
studied. In the rst one, interpreted as the case of a developed economy, the
cost of quantity is assumed to be relatively high with respect to the family
income, and the cost of quality relatively low. In this case, both C and TC
solutions lead to a positive investment in quality. The impact of the absence
of self control depends on the elasticity of substitution of preferences. In
the case of an elasticity of substitution greater than one, the absence of self
control implies a smaller fertility. The investment in quality is also lower for
 close to 1; but higher for a small value of :
In the second case, interpreted as the case of a developing economy, the
cost of quantity is assumed to be relatively low with respect to the family
income, and the cost of quality relatively high. The paper focuses on the
situation for which the investment in quality cancels out along the TC so-
lution, whereas it is positive for the C-solution. This case is thinkable for a
developing economy1, in which children only receive primary education. It
leads to a higher fertility rate for the TC solution than for the C solution. It
means that if the household could commit on its future education investment,
it would choose a lower fertility level. For instance, a policy that imposes
compulsory attendance at school for children can be viewed as a commitment
1A third case with no investment in quality for both solutions is not studied as it is not
interesting. Indeed, for no investment in quality in both solutions, TC and C solutions
give the same value of fertility.
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technology, which is expected to reduce fertility2.
The inuence of di¤erent parameters is considered. The time that parents
spent on their children implies a fall in family income, that can be viewed
in the model as the (opportunity) cost of fertility w0. This opportunity
cost mainly corresponds to wifes income. Considering the TC solution and
starting from a low value of w0, the fertility level is high and no education
investment occurs. An increase of w0 reduces fertility. At some threshold
value, the household begins to invest in quality. At this value, fertility un-
dergoes a jump downward and continues to decrease as w0 increases. A
second parameter of interest is the cost of education  :  represents the cost
of formal education that corresponds to tuition fees, school supplies. It can
also incorporate the opportunity cost of child labor for developing economies.
Starting from a high value, the economy features a high fertility level with
no education investment. As long as no investment in quality occurs, a de-
crease in  has of course no impact on fertility. At some threshold level, the
household starts to invest in quality. At this value, fertility undergoes a jump
downward and continues to decrease as  decreases3.
This model o¤ers two novel features with respect to the existing litera-
ture. In other words, two characteristics make it di¢ cult to infer directly
the impact of self-control on fertility and education from preceding studies of
savings, retirement behaviors, etc. The rst characteristic is the non-linearity
of the budget constraint deriving from the quantity-quality trade-o¤. The
cost of education is the product of quality time quantity. The second charac-
teristic comes from the property that no investment in quality is a possible
solution. This solution represents the case of a developing economy, for which
no investment in education is provided to children, except primary education.
Concerning the non-linearity of the budget constraint, one consequence is
that the lack of self-control may imply lower investment in quality for  close
to 1; but higher investment for a small value of . This result comes from the
property that the cost of quality depends on quantity, and quantity increases
with : In a model with a linear budget constraint, the lack of self-control
would have a monotonic impact.
The second novel feature comes from the case for which no investment
in quality is reached along the TC solution. When the quality level chosen
by self 2 cancels out, the optimal response for self 1 corresponds to a jump
2It is possible to consider a more general model with more than 3 periods of life for
agents. In this case the lack of commitment implies that children stop earlier their studies
in developing economies.
3For a high elasticity of substitution in the household preferences, it is possible that
the evolution of fertility becomes non-monotonic with  .
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in fertility. In other words, fertility is not continuous at the point for which
quality cancels out. This property is interesting, as it means that in the
neighborhood of this point, a small change in some parameters can lead to a
big change in fertility. For example, a small increase in the opportunity cost of
quantity can lead to a big reduction in fertility. This result can be explained
considering the objective function of self 1, along the TC solution. When
quality cancels out, the response function of self 2 undergoes a discontinuity
of its derivative. Whereas this derivative is negative for a positive investment
in quality (quality is a decreasing function of quantity), the derivative is
equal to zero when quality cancels out. As there is a discrepancy between
the objective functions of selves 1 and 2, the derivative of the self 1 objective
function undergoes a jump when quality cancels out. For this reason, two
levels of fertility may exist that are local maxima of the objective function of
self 1. If the change of a parameter leads to a jump from one local maximum
to the other one, there is a high variation in fertility at this point.
Few studies have been devoted to this property, that a continuous change
in some parameter can induce a jump of an endogenous variable, under quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. It can be true in all models in which the decision
of a self is subject to a constraint. Laibson (1997) was the rst to point
out the existence of discontinuous optimal strategies with quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, in a model of savings with imperfect capital markets. To avoid
the di¢ culties related to the non-convexity of the problem, he introduced
a restriction on the labor income process that ruled out the possibility of
corner solutions and discontinuous equilibrium strategies. Harris and Laib-
son (2002) have provided the most detailed study of this question. They
give an intuition of such pathologies. They present the results of numeri-
cal simulations, and conclude that such pathologies do not arise when the
model is calibrated with empirically sensible parameter values. Wigniolle
(2012) remarks that the calibrations in Harris and Laibson that can elimi-
nate the discontinuous strategies (a value of  close to 1, a small value for
the elasticity of substitution) are also those that make negligible the impact
of hyperbolic discounting. In other words, when hyperbolic discounting mat-
ters, it is necessary to deal with such pathologies. He provides a detailed
study of such discontinuous strategies in a simple framework that allows a
complete characterization.
These di¤erent studies point out the role of  : if  can depart signicantly
from 1; the existence of discontinuous strategies may occur. The value of 
may depend on the time horizon of decisions. If the frequency of decisions
is high, a value close to 1 is expected. If the interval of time between two
decisions is high, a low value of  may be relevant. For decisions concerning
fertility and education, it is reasonable to assume a low frequency and a
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small value of : Therefore, it seems relevant to expect a strong impact of
quasi-hyperbolic discounting on decisions and the occurrence of discontinuous
strategies cannot be ignored.
This work can also be compared with the literature about collective
choices with non-cooperative behaviors (cf. the seminal contributions of Ulph
1988, Woolley 1988 and Chen and Woolley 2001). This paper follows another
way, considering a unitary model of the household: coordination problems
within the household do not exist in order to take decisions during a given
period; the coordination problem exists in intertemporal choices between two
successive selves as preferences are not time-consistent. Some similarities can
be found between these two types of models: in both models, non-cooperative
behaviors may lead to an equilibrium that is not Pareto-optimal, there may
exist under/over provision of a public good within the family. However, there
exists an important di¤erence due to the intertemporal structure of the de-
cision process: in the game between selves living at di¤erent periods, the
self that plays rst has a strategic advantage. She/he can play a strategy in
taking into account the best response functions of future selves. The result-
ing Nash equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal in general, and this ine¢ ciency
is due to time inconsistency. The optimal policy in this context consists in
introducing a commitment technology that allows to implement the commit-
ment solution (C solution). The e¢ ciency of some institutional mechanism
to play the role of a commitment technology is then an important topic. In
the context of the quantity-quality trade-o¤ model of fertility, compulsory
school can be viewed as an example of a commitment technology. Compul-
sory school attendance implies a minimal investment of parents in the quality
of their children. Therefore, it can be viewed by the preceding self as a cred-
ible commitment on the future education of children, and it can lead to a
fertility choice that is closer to the optimal one.
Another di¤erence between the two types of models is that quasi-hyperbolic
discounting may give birth to non-discontinuous strategies. This property
was discussed in detail above. For the non-cooperative solution (TC), this
may imply a jump of fertility when the investment in education cancels out.
This novel feature may have strong economic implications. For instance,
there may exist threshold values in a policy promoting education or fertility:
this type of policy may have rst a smooth e¤ect on behaviors. At some
threshold value, a large drop in education and fertility may be observed.
A generalization of both models could be to consider coordination prob-
lems both within a given period among spouses and between periods among
the selves of each spouse. With such assumptions, two sources of non-
optimality in the decision process would exist.
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Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 gives the fertility decisions for
developed and developing economies. Section 4 studies how fertility and ed-
ucation decisions respond to changes in their costs. Section 5 concludes. A
nal appendix gives the proofs.
2 The model
2.1 Basic assumptions
The household behavior derives from a utility function dened on three peri-
ods and associated with a quasi-hyperbolic discounting factor.4 The life-cycle
of the household is represented in a very simple way. In the rst period, the
household chooses the quantity (number) of children. Children entail a cost
for rearing and primary education in the family that is assumed to be mainly
a cost in time proportional to the number of children. In the second pe-
riod, the household chooses the quality (education level) of children. Quality
results from formal education provided by teachers and it gives rise to a -
nancial cost for parents. Parents choose the same level of quality for each
child. In the third period, children become autonomous and their well-being
depends on the human capital that they have accumulated when young.
In period 1, self 1 preferences are given by the utility function:
u [c1] + u [c2] + 
2mU(q0 + q) (1)
with
u(x) =
x1 
1

1  1

; (2)
 < 1 and  > 0. c1 and c2 are respectively the consumption levels of the
household in periods 1 and 2.5  and  are two positive coe¢ cients not
greater than 1.  is the usual discount parameter and  is the bias for the
present. m is the number (quantity) of children. q0 + q is the quality level
of each child that is the sum of an exogenous value q0 and of the amount of
education q nanced by parents. U(q0+q) is the life-cycle utility level of each
child, that is assumed to depend on their human capital. This formulation
relies on three assumptions that are often considered in the literature (see e.g.
Becker and Barro 1988, Becker et alii 1990 or Jones and Schoonbroodt 2010).
4An objective function dened on three periods with one decision in the two rst periods
is the simplest framework in order to study self-control problems.
5In the two rst periods, children consumption does not appear explicitly. It is assumed
to be part of parents consumption. A simple justication for this assumption is that
children consumption may be equal to a constant share of parentsconsumption.
8
First, parents have altruistic feelings to their children: their utility depends
on the one of each child. Second, parents likes having children: utility is
increasing with the number m of children. Third, this increase is subject to
diminishing returns: an increase in m leads to an increase in the utility of
parents that is less than proportional.
As U(q0 + q) can be seen as the value function of a child, it is natural to
assume that
U(x) = u(x)
with  some positive constant. To keep a minimum number of parameters of
interest, it is possible to choose the units of the di¤erent variables in such a
way that  = 1:6
 and  cannot take any value to obtain a concave function that satises
the three preceding properties. As it is established in Jones and Schoonbroodt,
only the following restrictions are admissible:
 either 0 < 1  1=   < 1
 or 0 > 1  1=   >  1
To be able to deal with these two cases in the simplest framework, the
following assumption is retained:  = 1   1=. Under this condition, the
two cases correspond to  > 1 or 1=2 <  < 1: The third term of the utility
function can now be written
[m(q0 + q)]
1  1

1  1

The assumption  = 1  1= is equivalent to assume that parents value the
total revenue of their children, which can also be viewed as a particular warm
glow motivation for altruism.
The budget constraint of the family in period 1 is:
c1 = w1 + w0(1  m)
The family income consists of two parts: a constant part w1; and a variable
part w0(1   m) that depends on child quantity m.  is the time cost
for rearing and primary education in the family of one child. w0 is the
opportunity cost of parents to provide primary education to children. It
6Our formulation of altruism can also be viewed as a warm glow motivation of parents to
give some education to their children, following Andreoni (1989). Such type of formulations
have been extensively used by di¤erent authors, including Galor and Weil (2000) and De
la Croix Doepke (2003) that use the same assumption as this paper.
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is an average of the opportunity costs of parents weighted by their relative
participation to children rearing, assuming that both spouses devote time to
children primary education. w1 is the part of household revenues that does
not depend on the time devoted to children. As females in general devote
more time to children, w0 can be viewed approximately as the opportunity
cost of time for the wife (wifes income) and w1 as husbands income. The
resulting consumption level of the household is w1 + w0(1  m):
In period 2, the family income is w2:7 The education cost of children is
now a nancial cost, corresponding to the nancing of school fees.  is the
unit cost for one unit of quality for one child. Therefore mq is the cost
of providing a quality q to each of the m children, and the resulting second
period consumption level of the household is
c2 = w2   mq
In period 3, them children become autonomous from their parents. Their
intertemporal utility depends on their human capital level (q0 + q): Parents
are altruistic and value the well-being of their children.
Some remarks can be done on the utility function of self 1. First, con-
sumption levels of parents do no more depend on spending for their children
from period 3. Therefore it is not useful to include parents consumptions in
future periods as they will not play any role in the choice of quantity and
quality of children. Second, it is assumed that the altruism term in the utility
function that depends on quantity and quality of children appears in period
3. It would be possible to introduce other altruism terms in periods 1 and 2,
depending on fertility in period 1, and on fertility and education in period
2. These terms would only make more complicated the analysis, but they
would not add new features to the model. The model is designed in order to
remain tractable and our formulation is the simplest one allowing to take into
account the quality-quantity trade-o¤ in an intertemporal setting.8 Third, it
is assumed that parents choose the same level of quality for each child. This
assumption can be proved from the concavity of the objective function of the
household: it is optimal to give the same education level to each child.
7In period 2, education only implies a nancial cost and the model is unitary. Therefore,
all results will only depend on total income w2 and not on the income earned by each
spouse.
8Unlike most of articles that study the marginal e¤ect of a bias for the present, the
present paper characterizes cases in which the problem of self-control may induce qual-
itative changes in the behavior of agents, when quality cancels out. We then need a
formulation that allows an explicit expression for agents decisions.
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In the literature about fertility decisions, m is usually taken as a contin-
uous variable, since the seminal contributions of Becker and Lewis (1973),
and Becker and Tomes (1976). This allows to make standard optimization
calculations.
In period 2, self 2 preferences are given by:
u [c2] + m
u(q0 + q) (3)
The discount factor between period 3 and period 2 is  if it is computed by
self 1, and  if it is computed by self 2. The parameter  indicates whether
there is a self-control problem ( < 1) or not ( = 1).
Following Salanié and Treich (2006), the time-consistent solution is com-
pared to the commitment solution. The time-consistent solution (TC) is the
non cooperative equilibrium obtained from the game played by selves 1 and
2. More precisely, self 2 chooses q; m being given. Self 1 chooses m; taking
into account the best response function of self 2. The commitment solution
(C) is obtained by assuming that self 1 can choose both m and q:
2.2 Investment in quality
The best response function of self 2 for the TC solution
Self 2 takes m as given and chooses q following his best response function:
qTC(m) = argmax
(q)

u [w2   mq] + u [m(q0 + q)]
s. t. q  0
The solution to this program can be interior (q > 0) or not. Dening the
threshold
mTC  (=)
 w2
q0
the best response function of self 2 is:
qTC(m) =
8><>:
(=)
w2
m
 q0
1+()1 
0
if m  mTC
if m  mTC
(4)
qTC(m) is a non-increasing function of m:
The commitment solution
Assume that self 1 can commit in period 1 on a choice of q in period
2. To compare this solution with the preceding one, it is useful to split the
resolution in two steps: rstly the optimal choice of q for m given, secondly
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the optimal value of m; in taking into account the e¤ect of m on the optimal
choice of q: For m given, dening a new threshold
mC  (=)
 w2
q0
the optimal value of q if self 1 can commit on it in period 1 is:
qC(m) =
8<:
(=)
w2
m
 q0
1+1 
0
if m  mC
if m  mC
(5)
qC(m) is a non increasing function of m: It is clear that, for m given,
qC(m)  qTC(m) with a strict inequality when qC(m) > 0: For a given value
of fertility, self 10s optimal investment in quality is higher than that chosen
by self 2:
Remark: As usual, the fertility rate is assumed to be a continuous
variable. This simplifying assumption leads to meaningless results for m
tending toward 0: Indeed, qC(m) and qTC(m) tend to be innite when m
tends toward 0; with a discontinuity in m = 0: Thus, it will be appropriate
to eliminate parameter values leading to fertility rates close to 0.
3 Fertility decisions under quasi-hyperbolic
discounting
This section studies the impact of quasi-hyperbolic discounting on fertility
and education decisions. The time-consistent solution is compared to the
commitment solution. One important output of the quantity-quality trade-
o¤ model of fertility is to explain fertility and education behaviors through
standard economic variables: the costs of quantity and quality of children
with respect to family income. In such a framework, the evolution of be-
haviors through the development process can be explained by the changes
in the relative costs.9 In a developing economy, the cost of quantity (w0 in
our model) is low relatively to the income of the family as women have low
opportunities on the labor market. In a developed economy, this relative cost
is high as women have more opportunities to participate to the labor market.
As for the cost of education  ; it is high with respect to the income of the
family in a developing economy, and low in a developed economy. Indeed,
developed economies often feature high level of public subsidy in education.
9A general presentation of this literature is given by Birdsall (1988).
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As a consequence, the quantity-quality trade-o¤ model of fertility may ex-
plain why fertility is high in developing economies and education is low. It
may also be the case that children only receive primary education within the
family, but no formal education in a school, that corresponds to the case
q = 0 in the model.
Following this analysis, the impact of hyperbolic discounting will be stud-
ied in two cases. In the rst case, fertility is derived when it is associated
with a positive investment in education. In the second case, the corner so-
lution in which education cancels out is studied. The rst case may occur
when the cost of quantity (w0) is high enough and the cost of education  is
low enough with respect to family income. The second case may occur when
(w0) is low and  is high with respect to family income. The rst case will
be referred as the situation of a developed economy, and the second case as
the one of a developing country. A complete characterization of these two
cases will be provided related to parameter values.
3.1 The developed economy
In this part, the case of the developed economy is studied, for which the
cost of quantity is assumed to be relatively high with respect to the family
income, and the cost of quality relatively low. The time-consistent solution
is compared with the commitment solution, when both are interior solutions:
q > 0.
The time-consistent solution
Along the time-consistent solution, self 1 chooses m; taking into account
the best response function of self 2 given by equation (4). By assumption, m
is such that qTC(m) > 0 for a developed economy. Self 1s program is:
max
m0
u [w1 + w0(1  m)] + u

w2   mqTC(m)

+ 2u

m(q0 + q
TC(m))

Dening
A() 
 
1 +  1 1 

(1 +  1 ) 1
(6)
B 

q0
w0

(7)
the time-consistent solution is:
mTC =
() A()B (w1 + w0)  w2
q0 + w0 ()
 A()B
(8)
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This solution is valid only if mTC > 0; which is satised if
H()  () A()B > w2
w1 + w0
(9)
Following the preceding remark, the parameter values will be restricted
in such a way that (9) will hold in what follows.
The commitment solution
Along the commitment solution, self 1 chooses bothm and q: This solution
can be obtained using equation (5) with qC(m) > 0 by assumption. The
program is:
max
m0
u [w1 + w0(1  m)] + u

w2   mqC(m)

+ 2u

m(q0 + q
C(m))

The commitment solution is
mC =
() A(1)B (w1 + w0)  w2
q0 + w0 ()
 A(1)B
(10)
This solution is valid only if mC > 0; which gives the condition
() A(1)B >
w2
w1 + w0
(11)
Comparison between TC and C solutions
The only di¤erence between the two expressions (8) and (10) is the term
A() in place of A(1): As m is increasing with respect to A; mTC < mC if
and only if A() < A(1): It is easy to nd:
d ln [A()]
d
=
(   1) 1  2(1  ) 
1 +  1 1 

(1 +  1 )
As  < 1; A() < A(1)()  > 1:
If  > 1, mTC < mC : the time-consistent solution leads to a lower
fertility. As self 2 does not invest enough in education from the point of
view of self 1, and as education choice decreases with fertility, self 1s best
response is a reduction in fertility. If self 2 could commit on a higher level
of quality (for instance, if he could commit on the behavior qC(m)), self 1
would invest more in the quantity of children.
In the opposite case  < 1; the result is reversed. As self 2 under-invests
in quality, self 1 increases quantity with respect to the commitment solution.
This result is close to the one obtained by Salanié and Treich (2006),
in a model in which the decision variable of agents is savings. Applying
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their results to a CES utility function (2), they nd that the time-consistent
solution leads to undersavings i¤  > 1:
In the case  < 1; the lack of self control leads to higher fertility mTC >
mC : Therefore, it also leads to a lower quality investment : as mTC > mC ;
qC(mC) > qC(mTC) > qTC(mTC): The absence of commitment implies more
quantity and less quality.
In the case  > 1; it is not so easy to conclude on quality. Indeed, qC(m)
and qTC(m) are decreasing functions, with qC(m) > qTC(m) for a given
level of fertility m. But, as mTC < mC ; it is not possible yet to conclude
if qC(mC) ? qTC(mTC): Proposition 1 proves that parents under-invest in
quality when  is close to 1, but they over invest for a low value of :
The di¤erent results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Assuming an interior solution for m and q (m and q > 0),
 In the case  < 1; the lack of self control leads to higher fertility mTC >
mC and lower investment in education qC > qTC :
 In the case  > 1; the lack of self-control leads to lower investments
in quantity mTC < mC : The investment in quality is also lower for 
close to one, but higher for a low :
Proof. See Appendix 1
Assumption:  > 1:
The assumption  > 1 is retained in what follows. It corresponds to the
case favored by Salanié and Treich (2006), in which the lack of self-control
leads to under-savings. As a consequence of Proposition 1, for  > 1 and 
close to 1; every commitment mechanism on a higher investment in quality
increases fertility. For instance, a public policy in favor of commitment such
as compulsory schooling will lead to a higher fertility level. But for a low
value of ; there is over investment in quality. The intuition behind this
result is that, for a low value of ; as mTC becomes weak, the cost of quality
is very low. This result is due to the non linearity of the cost of education
which depends also on quantity. This non linearity is a particular feature of
the quantity-quality trade-o¤ model of fertility.
Another consequence of the case  > 1 is that the constraint (11) is
weaker than (9). Therefore, only (9) will be retained.
Existence of an interior solution
The time-consistent and commitment solutions must satisfy the following
inequalities: 0 < mTC < mTC , 0 < mC < mC : As mTC < mC ; only three
inequalities must be considered: 0 < mTC , mTC < mTC and mC < mC .
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Condition mTC > 0 is given by (9).
The inequality mTC < mTC gives:
Z() <
w2
w1 + w0
(12)
with Z dened as:
Z()  1
w0
 
q0
+ (w0)

(q0)
()

1+1 
1+ 11 

Finally, the inequality mC < mC gives:
G() <
w2
w1 + w0
(13)
with
G()  1
w0
 
q0
+ (w0)

(q0)
()
(14)
It is straightforward to see that G() < Z(): Therefore there remain two
necessary conditions for the existence of an interior solution of the household
program: (9) and (12).
3.2 The developing economy
This part focuses on the case of a developing economy, in which the cost of
quantity is assumed to be relatively low with respect to the family income,
and the cost of quality relatively high. From these assumptions, the time-
consistent solution may be a corner solution with no investment in quality
(qTC = 0). If the commitment solution is also associated with no education
investment (qC = 0), it is straightforward to see that the fertility level will
be the same for the two solutions C and TC. Therefore, this case is not
interesting as the lack of self-control has no impact on decisions.
More interesting is the case in which the commitment solution is asso-
ciated with some positive education investment (qC > 0). In this case, the
lack of commitment inuences education, and thus fertility behaviors.
The time-consistent solution without investment in quality
Considering the TC behavior in the corner solution with qTC = 0; the
fertility level mTC is given by the rst order condition:
 w0 [w1 + w0(1  m)] 1= + 2m 1=q1 1=0 = 0
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The solution is denoted by ~mTC and is equal to:
~mTC =
 
2

(w0)
  q 10 (w1 + w0)
1 +
 
2

(w0)
1  q 10
(15)
Using (4), condition ~mTC > mTC ensuring that qTC = 0 gives the following
inequality:
w2
w1 + w0
< D() (16)
with
D()  1
w0()
 
q0
+ (w0)

(q0)
()
(17)
Comparison with the commitment solutions
By assumption, the commitment solution is associated with some positive
education investment (qC > 0). Therefore, mC is still given by (10), and
condition (13) must be fullled. The comparison between ~mTC given by
(15), and mC given by (10) gives the following result:
Proposition 2 When the lack of self-control leads to no investment in qual-
ity for the time-consistent solution and to a positive investment for the com-
mitment solution, the fertility level is higher for the rst time-consistent so-
lution: ~mTC > mC.
Proof. From (15) and (10), the inequality ~mTC > mC is equivalent to
G() <
w2
w1 + w0
This condition holds by assumption, as it corresponds to (13), which was
obtained in writing the inequality mC < mC .
This proposition shows that the lack of self-control has a di¤erent im-
pact in the developing economy, as it tends to increase fertility. If self 2
could commit on some positive investment in quality, self 1 would invest less
in quantity. In a developed country, a policy measure that favors commit-
ment increases fertility. In a developing economy, such a measure will reduce
fertility.
How to understand this result? For the TC solution, while qTC remains
positive, self 1 gives birth to fewer children in order to obtain more investment
in quality by self 2. But, when qTC cancels out, decreasing fertility has no
more impact on quality. The optimal response of self 1 is now to increase his
fertility level.
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Conditions for a positive investment in quality
Considering the TC behavior, two solutions have been found: one interior
solution associated with a positive investment in quality and one constrained
solution with no investment in quality. The rst one must satisfy the con-
dition Z() < w2
w1+w0
and the second one w2
w1+w0
< D(). It is easy to check
that Z() < D(): Therefore, three cases may exist. If w2
w1+w0
> D(); only
the interior solution exists. If w2
w1+w0
< Z() only the constrained solution
exists. If Z() < w2
w1+w0
< D(); the problem is to choose between the two
solutions.
To understand this point, it is useful to consider the rst order condition
of the program of self 1. Self 1 chooses the optimal value of m; taking into
account the best response function of self 2 qTC(m):
0 =  w0u0 [w1 + w0(1  m)]  qTC(m)u0

w2   mqTC(m)

+2(q0 + q
TC(m))u0

m(q0 + q
TC(m))

+m
dqTC(m)
dm
 u0 w2   mqTC(m)+ u0 m(q0 + qTC(m))	
For the commitment solution, the rst order condition is the same, except
that qTC(m) is replaced by qC(m): But, for the commitment solution, the
expression  u0 w2   mqC(m)+ u0 m(q0 + qC(m)) cancels out by de-
nition of qC(m): For the time-consistent solution, the expression
 u0 w2   mqTC(m) + u0 m(q0 + qTC(m)) is positive, as qTC(m) is
implicitly dened by  u0 w2   mqTC(m) + u0 m(q0 + qTC(m)) = 0:
This is the consequence of the discrepancy between the objective functions of
self 1 and self 2. For the derivative dqTC(m)=dm; there is a discontinuity in
mTC : this derivative is negative to the left of mTC ; and is zero to the right.
The consequence of this analysis is that the derivative of self 1s objec-
tive function is always continuous for the commitment solution. But, for the
time-consistent solution, the derivative of self 1s objective function is discon-
tinuous at the point mTC ; with a higher value to the right of mTC : It is then
possible that self 1 objective function admits two local maxima. The func-
tion is concave on each interval
 
0; mTC

and
 
mTC ;+1 and continuous,
but the derivative is discontinuous in mTC :
Figure 1 presents a numerical simulation with the following values of
parameters:  = 2;  = 0:5;  = 0:17;  = 0:5;  = 1; w2 = 2; q0 = 0:5 and
w1 = 1: The di¤erent curves are obtained for di¤erent values of the parameter
w0
10. The objective function of self 1 with respect to m is drawn. The value
10The same type of analysis could be carried out with respect to another parameter
than w0:
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w0 = 0:951856 is such that the two local maxima give the same value to the
utility. For w0 smaller than this value, the optimal behavior is to give birth
to many children ( ~mTC) and to not invest in their education. For w0 higher
than this value, the optimal behavior is to have a small number of children
(mTC) and to invest in their quality.
Considering self 1s objective function, under the condition Z() < w2
w1+w0
<
D(), this function of m has two local maxima: one associated with a posi-
tive investment in education (mTC) and one for which education cancels out
( ~mTC). Therefore it is necessary to compare the utility levels obtained for
each local maximum. UTC denotes the indirect utility level when qTC is pos-
itive and ~UTC the utility level when qTC is zero. The following lemma shows
that the equality UTC = ~UTC implicitly denes a function V () such that
w2
w1+w0
= V (), UTC = ~UTC : Moreover, UTC > ~UTC , w2
w1+w0
> V ():
Lemma 1 Assume that Z() < w2
w1+w0
< D(): The condition UTC > ~UTC
holds i¤: 
w2
w1 + w0
w0
q0
+ 1
1 1= "
1 +

w0
q0
1 
() A()
#1=
(18)
>
"
1 +

w0
q0
1   
2
#1=
+ 

w2
w1 + w0
1 1=
This inequality implicitly denes a function V () such that
UTC > ~UTC , w2
w1 + w0
> V (); (19)
and this function satises:
Z() < V () < D():
Proof. See Appendix 2.
This lemma allows characterizing the optimal solution for w2
w1+w0
2 [Z(); D()] :
If w2
w1+w0
> V (); the optimal TC-solution is such that qTC > 0: If w2
w1+w0
<
V (); the optimal TC-solution is such that qTC = 0:
3.3 Existence of the di¤erent regimes
This part provides a characterization of the existence of the di¤erent regimes
with respect to the parameter : It is based on a technical lemma:
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Lemma 2  H() is an increasing function of ; and when  goes from
0 to 1; H() goes from 0 to (q0)
 (w0)
 (1+ 1 ) > D(1): More-
over, for every ; H() > Z():
 G; Z; V and D are such that: 8 2 (0; 1) ;
G() < Z() < V () < D()
and
G(1) = Z(1) = V (1) = D(1) =
(q0)
 (w0)
 
1 + q 10 
2(w0)1 
 G increases with  and D decreases with .
Proof. The proof results from straightforward calculations.
This lemma allows a complete characterization of the di¤erent cases. Pa-
rameters are restricted to be such that (9) holds, or w2=(w1 + w0) < H():
In this zone, the preceding analysis has shown that the functions G() and
V () are the pertinent frontiers. The set of parameters can be divided into
3 sub-zones A; B and C. The following proposition gives for each zone the
corresponding expressions of fertility and education. A numerical illustra-
tion (see Figure 2) is provided for the following values of parameters :  = 2;
 = 0:5;  = 0:17;  = 1; q0 = 0:5:
Proposition 3  The plan (; w2=(w1+w0)) can be separated into three
zones:
Zone A = f(; w2=(w1 + w0)); w2=(w1 + w0) < G()g,
Zone B = f(; w2=(w1 + w0)); G() < w2=(w1 + w0) < V ()g ;
Zone C = f(; w2=(w1 + w0)); V () < w2=(w1 + w0)g.
 Assuming that parameters are such that w2=(w1 + w0) < H();
in zone A; qC = qTC = 0 and ~mC = ~mTC ;
in zone B; qTC = 0; qC > 0 and ~mTC > mC ;
in zone C; qTC > 0; qC > 0 and mTC < mC :
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of lemmas (1) and (2).
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In zone A, the optimal behavior in both cases leads to no investment in
quality. When investment in quality cancels out, both solutions are associ-
ated with the same level of fertility.
In zone B, the time consistent solution leads to a higher level of fertility
than the commitment solution, and to no investment in childrens quality. If
self 2 could commit on a higher investment in education, self 1 would invest
less in quantity.
Zone C corresponds to the developed economy with a positive investment
in quality. The temporary consistent solution leads to lower investment in
quantity. If self 2 could commit on a higher investment in education, self 1
would invest more in quantity.
For a given value of w2=(w1+w0); it is possible that all three zones A; B
and C are successively reached depending on the value of :
Two cases may happen. In the case w2=(w1+w0) < G(1); zone A appears
for  close to 1; zone B for  such that G() < w2=(w1+w0) < V (); zone C
appears only if there exist values of  such that V () < w2=(w1+w0) < H():
In the case w2=(w1 + w0) > G(1); only zones B and C may exist because
G() is always smaller than G(1) < w2=(w1 + w0): These results show that
the impact of  on the investments in quality can be ambiguous for the TC
solution. Indeed, an increase of  has a twofold e¤ect. For a given level of
fertility, increasing  rises the investment in quality. But an increase in 
also rises the investment in quantity, which has a negative impact on the
investment in quality.
4 Impact of the costs of fertility and educa-
tion
This section studies how fertility and education behaviors respond to changes
of w0 and  :
4.1 E¤ect of w0
w0 play a crucial role in education and fertility. An increase of w0 has a
twofold impact: rst it increases the opportunity cost of the quantity of
children; second, for a given level of fertility, it increases the rst period
income of the family. The rst e¤ect (e¤ect on the price) is expected to
dominate the second one (e¤ect on the revenue), as in the standard trade-o¤
model between consumption and leisure. Therefore, the increase of w0 is
expected to imply a fall in fertility.
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In writing equation (8) under the form:
mTC =
() A()(q0)
 (w1+w0)
w0
  w2(w0) 1
q0(w0) 1 + ()
 A()(q0)
it is straightforward thatmTC is a decreasing function of w0 as the numerator
is decreasing and the denominator is increasing. Using the same argument,
mC given by (10) is also decreasing with respect to w0: Finally, when educa-
tion cancels out, equation (15) can be written again as
~mTC =
 
2

q 10
(w1+w0)
w0
(w0)
 1 +
 
2

q 10
which is decreasing with w0:
In all cases, fertility decreases with respect to w0: A change of w0 can
also result in a change of regime, and a drop in fertility. Starting from the
fertility level without education ~mTC ; an increase of w0 implies a decrease
in fertility. This change of w0 may induce such a decrease in fertility that it
becomes optimal to invest in quality. At this point, there is a discontinuity in
fertility that experiences a fall between ~mTC and mTC : In the neighborhood
of the frontier value of w0; a small increase of w0 induces a great drop in fer-
tility. This jump is the consequence of the discrepancy between the objective
functions of self 1 and self 2. Figure 3 gives a numerical illustration for the
following values of parameters :  = 2;  = 0:5;  = 0:17;  = 0:5;  = 1;
w2 = 2; q0 = 0:5; w1 = 1: Parameters are such that for w0 = 0:951856 there
is the discontinuity in fertility.
The frontiers between the di¤erent regimes can be characterized with re-
spect to w0: They cannot be deduced from Figure 2, as the di¤erent functions
H; V and G depend on w0: The characterization is made in the plan (w0; w1):
As before, parameters are constrained in such a way that mTC > 0; which
corresponds to condition (9). This constraint denes in the plan (w0; w1) a
zone such that w1 > WH(w0); with WH a function dened in Appendix (3).
The same method is used for condition (13): a function WG(w0) is intro-
duced, such that the condition holds i¤ w1 < WG(w0): Finally, the function
W V (w0) is introduced, such that condition (19) holds i¤w1 < W V (w0): The
three functions WH(w0); WG(w0) and W V (w0) allow to obtain a character-
ization of the di¤erent regimes in the plan (w0; w1): This characterization
is equivalent to the one given in section 3.3 in the plan

; w2
w1+w0

; but it
shows the role of w0 in the existence of the di¤erent regime.
The following proposition gives the complete characterizations of the dif-
ferent regimes in the plan (w0; w1); using the frontiers dened by the three
functions WH(w0); WG(w0) and W V (w0).
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Proposition 4  It is possible to dene three functionsWH(w0); WG(w0)
and W V (w0) that are non-decreasing functions of w0; and for all w0;
WG(w0) > W
V (w0):
 The plan (w0; w1) can be separated in three zones:
Zone A =

(w0; w1) ; w1 > W
G(w0)
	
,
Zone B =

(w0; w1) ; W
V (w0) < w1 < W
G(w0)
	
;
Zone C =

(w0; w1) ; w1 < W
V (w0)
	
.
 Assuming that parameters are such that w1 > WH(w0);
in zone A; qC = qTC = 0 and ~mC = ~mTC ;
in zone B; qTC = 0; qC > 0 and ~mTC > mC ;
in zone C; qTC > 0; qC > 0 and mTC < mC :
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Zone A is obtained for a low value of w0; qC = qTC = 0 and ~mC = ~mTC .
As the opportunity cost of children is small, fertility is high and parents do
not invest in quality.
In zone B; qTC = 0 but qC > 0 and ~mTC > mC . For an intermediate value
of w0; the TC behavior leads to no investment in quality, whereas parents
invest in quality along the commitment solution. Fertility is lower for the
commitment solution.
In zone C; qTC and qC are both positive andmTC < mC . For a high value
of w0; the TC and C solutions are associated with a positive investment in
quality, and fertility is higher for the commitment solution.
A consequence of these results for the TC behavior is that fertility ex-
periences a strong discontinuity for w0 =
 
W V
 1
(w1)  wl0: In the neigh-
borhood of this value wl0, a small increase of w0 leads to a large drop in
fertility.
Figure 4 shows a numerical simulation of the di¤erent zones in the plan
(w0; w1); for the same values of parameters as Figure 3. For w1 = 1; fertility
experiences a discontinuity at the value w0 = 0:951856.
The discontinuity in the optimal strategy of self 1 is a particular feature of
the model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In the model with exponential
discounting, a change in the value of some parameter results in a continuous
e¤ect on the choices of the agent. In the model with quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting, it is possible to observe jumps that are related to the non-concavity
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of self ones objective. This property introduces a qualitative di¤erence in
the two models that may have important empirical consequences. If the
model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting is relevant, fertility behaviors may
undergo large changes for some critical values of the parameters. This may
have consequences for the empirical analysis of fertility and for the dynamics
of demographic transitions.
4.2 E¤ect of 
The parameter  is the cost of education. An increase of  changes the
optimal trade-o¤ between quality and quantity. The following proposition
summarizes the e¤ect of  on fertility and education.
Proposition 5  mC increases when the cost of education  increases,
and qCdecreases.
 If  is small enough, i.e.   1=(1  ); mTC increases when the cost
of education  increases, and qTC(mTC) decreases. If  > 1=(1   );
mTC increases with  when  is small ( in a neighborhood of 0). But,
numerical simulations show that mTC can be a non monotonic function
of  (see Figure 6).
 There exists a threshold ; with  > 1=(1   ); such that if  < ;
qTC(mTC) decreases with  :
Proof. See Appendix 4.
For the commitment solution, an increase of  reduces the investment in
education, and increases fertility. This result is standard in the basic model
of quantity-quality trade-o¤. For a given level of fertility, an increase of 
reduces the investment in education q. As q is lower, the cost of fertility
decreases and fertility increases. For the TC-solution, the same e¤ect is
obtained for a small value of : But if  is very high,  can have a non
monotonic e¤ect.
As for w0; there exists a threshold level  l such that education cancels out
for  >  l. At this point  l, fertility undergoes a large drop to a higher value,
as education falls to zero. Figures 5 and 6 show how fertility may evolve with
respect to  : Figure 5 uses the preceding values for the di¤erent parameters:
 = 2;  = 0:17;  = 0:5;  = 1; q0 = 0:5; w0 = 1; w1 = 1; w2 = 2: The
threshold level from which education cancels out is  l = 0:516066:
Figure 6 is an example of parameters leading to a non-monotonic evolu-
tion of fertility for a high value of .  = 4 > 1=(1   ) = 2;  = 0:28;
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 = 0:5;  = 1; q0 = 1:5; w0 = 1; w1 = 1; w2 = 2: The threshold level is
 l = 0:341284:  can be interpreted as the elasticity of substitution between
consumptions. The value of  is a controversial question in economics. A
value close to one corresponds to the one retained in calibrated macroeco-
nomic models. Microeconomic estimations often conclude to a smaller value.
A value  > 1=(1   ) does not seem to be the most relevant assumption.
Therefore, a non monotonic evolution of m with respect to  is not very
plausible.
An increase of  also inuences the existence of the di¤erent regimes. This
question is studied in the plan (; w2=(w1 + w0)) ; considering how the di¤er-
ent frontiers G() and V () are modied. For  given, it is straightforward
from (14) that G() in an increasing function of  : As could be expected,
the region A in which no education occurs increases with  : Consequently
there is less space for regions B and C. The frontier between regions B and
C is dened with the function V (): Appendix 5 shows that V () increases
with  . A numerical experiment is provided in Figure 7, with the following
parameters  = 2;  = 0:17;  = 1; q0 = 0:5,  = 0:5 and  = 0:7: The case
 = 0:7 is presented with bold lines.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the quantity-quality fertility model under the as-
sumption of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The impact of the absence of self
control is isolated through the comparison between the TC solution (sophis-
ticated behavior) and the C solution (commitment solution). The lack of self
control may have di¤erent impact on fertility in a developed economy and
in a developing one. In a developed economy characterized by a positive
investment in quality, the lack of self control tends to reduce fertility. In a
developing economy, the lack of self-control may lead to both no investment
in quality and a higher fertility rate. It is also proved that if parents cannot
commit on their investment in quality, a small change of parameters may
lead to a jump in fertility and education.
This paper could be extended in di¤erent directions. First, the robust-
ness of the results could be studied if the model was enriched by additional
assumptions: access to capital markets for the households, imperfect capital
markets through borrowing constraints, collective choice within the house-
hold, etc. Secondly, a technical improvement could be made by introducing
more than three periods and more than two decisions.
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6 Appendixes
6.1 Appendix 1
The comparison between mTCand mC is made in the text. In the case  < 1;
the comparison between qC(mC) and qTC(mTC) is simple and is made in the
text. It remains to compare qC(mC) and qTC(mTC) when  > 1:
First, it appears that:
qTC(mTC) + qo =
(=)
 
w2
mTC
+ q0

1 + ()  1 
27
and
qC(mC) + qo =
(=)
 
w2
mC
+ q0

1 + ()  1 
From (8), is obtained:
w2
mTC
+ q0 =
() A()B [q0 (w1 + w0) + w2w0]
() A()B (w1 + w0)  w2 (20)
From (10), is obtained:
w2
mC
+ q0 =
() A(1)B [q0 (w1 + w0) + w2w0]
() A(1)B (w1 + w0)  w2 (21)
As A(1) = 1 +  1 ; it follows:
qTC(mTC) + qo < q
C(mC) + qo ,
()
1 + ()  1 
A()
() A()B (w1 + w0)  w2 <
1
() A(1)B (w1 + w0)  w2
(22)
After rearranging and using the expression (6) of A(); it is possible to write
this inequality:
0 < B (w1 + w0) 
   w2f() (23)
with
f() 

1+1 
+1 

  1
1  
Firstly the inequality (23) is studied in a neighborhood of  = 1: In
setting x = ; a function g is introduced such that:
g(x) 

1+x1 
x1=+x1 

  1
1  x = f()
The limit of g when x tends toward 1 is equal to the limit of f in  = 1:
Dening a function h(x) such that:
h(x) 

1 + x 1 
x1= + x 1 

this limit is equal to  h0(1): Taking the derivative of the logarithm of h in
x = 1; it is obtained:
h0(1) = h0(1)=h(1) =
 1 
1 +  1 
  1 + 
 1 
1 +  1 
=   1
1 +  1 
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Thus, with  = 1; (23) becomes:
0 < B (w1 + w0) 
   w2
1 +  1 
which is satised as it corresponds to (11) with  = 1: It is then proved that
qTC < qC in a neighborhood of  = 1:
Secondly, the inequality (23) is studied for a low value of :When  tends
toward 0; f() tends to be innite, the inequality (23) cannot be satised,
and qTC > qC :  close to 0 is not possible as it implies negative values for
mTCand mC : The smallest possible value of  corresponds to the constraint
(9) ensuring mTC > 0:When  tends to this value, the left-hand side of (22)
tends to be innite. Thus, when  is low enough, (23) cannot be satised,
and qTC > qC :
6.2 Appendix 2
In this appendix, a new notation x is introduced for the expression w2
w1+w0
:
Assume that Z() < x < D(): The equality UTC = ~UTC implicitly denes
x as a function of : f(x; ) = 0 with
f(x; )     1


UTC   ~UTC
 1
(w1 + w0)1 1=
=
x
w0
q0
+ 1
1 1= "
1 +

w0
q0
1 
() A()
#1=
 
"
1 +

w0
q0
1   
2
#1=   x1 1=
First, it is proved that @f=@x > 0: The condition @f=@x > 0 is equivalent
to:
w0
q0

x
w0
q0
+ 1
 1= "
1 +

w0
q0
1 
() A()
#1=
> x 1=
which is equivalent to
x >
1
w0
q0

()  + w0
q0
[A()  1]
 
()
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From this inequality, as by assumption x > Z(); if Z() > 
(); the
property x > 
() will be satised and @f=@x > 0.
Z() > 
() is equivalent to:
w0
q0

A()  1  ()  1 + w0
q0

() 

1  1 + ()
  1 
A()

> 0
From the denition of A(); A() > 1 + ()  1  , 1 +  1 1  >
1 + ()  1  which is true for  < 1:
Finally the property @f=@x > 0 is proved.
The next step is to prove that f(Z(); ) < 0 and f(D(); ) > 0: These
two inequalities with the property @f=@x > 0 will ensure the existence and
uniqueness of x as a function V () of :
After tedious calculations, it is possible to write f(Z(); ) < 0 under
the form
1 +

w0
q0
1   
2
  +  1 
1 +  1 
 1
<
"
1 +

w0
q0
1   
2
#1= "
1 +

w0
q0
1   
2
  +  1 
1 +  1 
#1 1=
The following notations are introduced:
a =

w0
q0
1   
2

y() =
 +  1 
1 +  1 
It is possible to write the preceding inequality:
[1 + ay() 1]
[1 + ay()] 1
< 1 + a (24)
The function y() increases from 0 toward 1 when  goes from 0 to 1:
As a function of y; the expression
[1 + ay 1]
[1 + ay] 1
is strictly increasing when y goes from 0 to 1; and is equal to 1+ a for y = 1:
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By these two properties, it is proved that (24) is satised.
The condition f(D(); ) > 0 can be written after some calculations"
1 +

w0
q0
1 

 
1 +  1 
#1 1= "
1 +

w0
q0
1 

( +  1 )
(1 +  1 ) 1
#1=
> 1 +

w0
q0
1 

 
 +  1 

The following notations are introduced:
b =

w0
q0
1 

 = 1 +  1 
 =  +  1 
By denition,    with a strict inequality for  < 1: It is possible to write
the preceding inequality:
1 + b

 1
>
(1 + b)
(1 + b) 1
(25)
Dening the function g:
g() = 1 + b

 1
  (1 + b)

(1 + b) 1
it is easy to check that it is strictly decreasing for  2 [0; ] ; with g() = 0:
Therefore, it is proved that (25) is satised, and f(D(); ) > 0.
6.3 Appendix 3
Condition (13) can be written under a condition on w0 and w1: The inequality
w2
w1+w0
> G() is equivalent to:
w1 <

 w2
q0
  1

w0 +
w2(w0)

(q0) ()
   (w0)
The right-hand side member of this inequality is a function   of w0 such that:
if 
 w2
q0
> 1;   is strictly increasing; if 
 w2
q0
< 1;   is U-shaped, rst
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decreasing and then increasing. As w1 cannot be negative, the negative part
of   does not play any role. The function WG is dened a
WG(w0) = max f (w0); 0g
By denition, either WG(w0) is strictly increasing, or it is rst equal to 0;
and then strictly increasing.
For condition (12), the inequality w2
w1+w0
> Z() is equivalent to:
w1 <

 w2
q0
  1

w0 +
w2(w0)

(q0)


1 +  1 
 +  1 

 #(w0)
As for the preceding example, a function WZ is dened as
WZ(w0) = max f#(w0); 0g
By denition, WZ(0) = 0; either WZ(w0) is strictly increasing, or it is rst
equal to 0; and then strictly increasing.
For condition (16), the inequality w2
w1+w0
< D() is equivalent to:
w1 >

 w2
q0
  1

w0 +
w2(w0)

(q0)
  (w0)
As for the preceding examples, a function WD is dened as
WD(w0) = max f(w0); 0g
By denition, WD(0) = 0; either WZ(w0) is strictly increasing, or it is rst
equal to 0; and then strictly increasing.
Finally condition (9) can be written:
w1 >
w2(w0)

(q0) ()

(1 +  1 ) 1 
1 +  1 1 
   w0  (w0)
As for the preceding examples, a function WH is dened as
WH(w0) = max f(w0); 0g
By denition, WH(w0) is rst equal to 0; and then strictly increasing.
Lemma 4 with Appendix 2 allow to dene a function V () such that
w2
w1+w0
= V () , UTC = ~UTC : This function V () depends on di¤erent
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parameters of the model including w0; but does not depend on w1: Therefore,
it is clear that it can be expressed under the form:
w1 =
w2
V ()
  w0
A function W V is dened as:
W V (w0) = max

w2
V ()
  w0; 0

As Z() < V () < D(); it implies that: WD(w0) < W V (w0) < WZ(w0):
To nd how W V (w0) evolves with w0; it is useful to come back to the
denition. When w1 = W V (w0) is positive, the function is implicitly dened
by the relation UTC   ~UTC = 0: The derivative is implicitly given by:
dW V (w0)
dw0
=  
@(UTC  ~UTC)
@w0
@(UTC  ~UTC)
@w1
If
@(UTC  ~UTC)
@w0
6= 0; it will prove thatW V (w0) is monotonic. AsWD(w0) <
W V (w0) < W
Z(w0); with WD(w0) and WZ(w0) two increasing functions
tending to +1 when w0 ! +1; the only possibility will be that W V (w0) is
monotonically increasing.
It is possible to prove that
@(UTC  ~UTC)
@w0
> 0: UTC is the maximum value
of self 1s objective function when qTC(m) > 0: ~UTC is the maximum value of
self 1s objective function when qTC(m) = 0: The derivatives can be obtained
using the envelope theorem:
@UTC
@w0
= (1  mTC) w1 + w0(1  mTC)  1
@ ~UTC
@w0
= (1   ~mTC) w1 + w0(1   ~mTC)  1
As  > 1; the function x [w1 + w0x]
  1
 is an increasing function of x; as its
logarithmic derivative is
w1 + (   1)w0x
x (w1 + w0x)
Consequently, the function (1   m) [w1 + w0(1  m)] 
1
 is a decreasing
function of m: As ~mTC > mTC ; it is obtained that,
@UTC
@w0
>
@ ~UTC
@w0
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which implies that the function W V (w0) is increasing.
6.4 Appendix 4
From (10), mC can be written:
mC =
x() (w1 + w0)  w2q0
1 + w0x()
with x()  () q 10 (w0) ( 1+ s): Taking the derivative of mC with
respect to  ; it is obtained that the sign of this derivative is the sign of the
expression:
x0() (w1 + w0) +
w2
 2q0

[1 + w0x()] 

x() (w1 + w0)  w2
q0

[w0x
0()]
= x0()

(w1 + w0) + w0
w2
q0

+
w2
 2q0
[1 + w0x()] > 0
Thus, mC is an increasing function of  :
From (5), the quality level q is such that:
q0
 + q( + ) = 
w2
mC
If  increases, as mC increases, q must decrease.
From (8), the time-consistent solution can be written:
mTC =
y() (w1 + w0)  w2q0
1 + w0y()
with y()  () q 10 (w0)  1A(): If y0() > 0; it is known from the
preceding calculation that mTC increases with  ; as the sign of @mTC=@ is
given by
y0()

(w1 + w0) + w0
w2
q0

+
w2
 2q0
[1 + w0y()] > 0
Therefore, it remains to check if  1A() increases with  : After some cal-
culations, it is obtained that
@y()=@
y()
=
d ln [ 1A()]
d
= (   1) 1  [(1  )  1] 
 1 1 

 
1 +  1 1 

(1 +  1 )
(26)
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If (1   ) < 1; y0() > 0 and mTC increases with  : If (1   ) > 1; it is
not possible to achieve a general conclusion. For  small enough ( ! 0); it
is possible to show from (26) that
y0()

(w1 + w0) + w0
w2
q0

+
w2
 2q0
[1 + w0y()] 
!0
 2
 
a  b 1
with a and b two positive constant parameters. Therefore, mTC increases
with  when  is small.
Assuming that mTC increases with  ; from (4), the quality level q is such
that:
q0
 + q( + () ) = ()
w2
mTC
If  increases, as mTC increases, q must decrease.
Considering now qTC(mTC); Appendix 1 has shown that
qTC(mTC) + qo =
(=)
 
w2
mTC
+ q0

1 + ()  1 
or
qTC(mTC)+qo =
() [q0 (w1 + w0) + w2w0]
 + () 
() A()B
() A()B (w1 + w0)  w2
It is easy to check that the rst term
() [q0 (w1 + w0) + w2w0]
 + () 
=
()

q0 (w1 + w0) +
w2w0


 1 + ()
is a decreasing function of  as  > 1:
Dening z() = () A()B; the second term can be written
z()
z() (w1 + w0)  w2
This is a decreasing function with respect to z(): Therefore, if z() increases
with  ; it will be obtained that qTC(mTC) is a decreasing function of  :
z() can be written:
z() = ()

q0
w0
   +  1
( + ) 1
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The sign of z0()=z() is given by the sign of:
 2 1 +  1
 2 (1  ) + (2  ) + + 22 1
A su¢ cient condition to have z0() > 0 is that 2 (1  )+(2  )+ > 0:
Considering this second degree equation in ; the property z0() > 0 will hold
if
 <   2   +
p
4  32
2(1  )
It is easy to check that  > 1=(1  ) as it is equivalent to  < 1:
6.5 Appendix 5
This appendix proves that V () increases with  : This function has been
dened in Appendix 2 as the solution x implicitly dened by the equation:
f(x; ) = 0 with x = w2
w1+w0
and
f(x; ) =
   1


UTC   ~UTC
 1
(w1 + w0)1 1=
From this denition, it appears that
@V ()
@
=  
@f
@
@f
@x
In Appendix 2, it was shown that @f
@x
> 0: It remains to prove that @f
@
< 0;
which is equivalent to prove that:
@(UTC  ~UTC)
@
< 0: UTC is the maximum
value of self 1s objective function when qTC(m) > 0: ~UTC is the maximum
value of self 1s objective function when qTC(m) = 0: The derivatives can be
obtained using the envelope theorem:
@UTC
@w0
=  mTCqTC w2   mTCqTC)  1
@ ~UTC
@w0
= 0
Therefore,
@(UTC  ~UTC)
@
< 0 and V () is an increasing function of  :
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